God in Patristic Thought, G L Prestige pp. 162ff

Home / God in Patristic Thought, G L Prestige pp. 162ff

We may now turn to the consideration of the word ‘hypostasis,’ which was ultimately accepted as the technical description in Greek philosophical theology of what the Latins called the personae of God. Apart from theology, hypostasis was used in a great variety of senses, both in the Old and New Testaments and in other writings. A wide survey of different meanings it could bear is made by Leontius of Jerusalem (c. Nest. 2.1). Broadly speaking, it may be said that the purport of the term is derived in one group of usages from the middle voice of the verb ὑφίστημι, and in another from the active voice. Thus it may mean either that which underlies, or that which gives support.

In the former sense it presents some exceptionally interesting features. It is used in the Clementine Homilies of a sediment or deposit (hom. 6.7). The author is discussing the legend of Kronos, and argues that, when the primordial substance was devoured by Kronos, it sank downwards; the heaviest elements sank to the bottom and were named Pluto; after these first dregs, the water which flowed together and floated on the first hypostasis (i.e. sediment) was called Poseiden; while the element of fire which rose highest and is the source of life was called Zeus. The historian, Socrates (h.e. 3.7), quotes Irenaeus Grammaticus for the application of the term hypostasis to the dregs of wine in the cask. There is nothing new in the usage, since Aristotle and Hippocrates are both quoted by Liddell and Scott as using the term to denote sediment. However, it also occurs in a wider sense to denote the underneath or hidden part of an object. Thus Macarius magnes (3.43) observes that counterfeit coins, when dipped in gold, present a bright surface, but their hypostasis is base metal. So to Epiphanius a purely metaphorical use does not come amiss, when he writes (haer. 66.71) that with the process of the times the hypostasis of the power of the divine commands comes to be revealed; presumably what he means is that, in the course of progressive revelation, men come to realise the hidden purpose underlying divine commands.

In the Septuagint hypostasis is the term employed to denote the encampment of the Philistines (1Sam. xiii. 23) and xiv. 4). It is also quoted from the poet Sophocles (frag. 644) by Irenaeus Grammaticus, in the passage to which reference has already been made, in the sense of ambush. Origen (on St John 2.35, 215) remarks that the directive hypostasis of Christ extends over all the world in rational souls: this appears to mean that there is an occupation of the individual human rational consciousness by the Logos, and the hypostasis should therefore be translated ‘seat’ or ‘station’.

In the light of these passages, the true interpretation becomes apparent of a very troublesome statement in Clement (strom. 2.18, 96.2)1, of which the meaning has for long presented some peculiar difficulties. Clement has been discussing the humanity of the Law, and finally illustrates his point by reference to the treatment of fruit trees. They are ordered, he says, to be tended and pruned for three years. To gather fruit from immature trees is forbidden; only in the fourth year is fruit to be plucked, after the tree has attained maturity. He then proceeds to argue that this figure of husbandry should teach us to be diligent in eradicating the suckers of sin and the barren weeds of the mind, which spring up alongside the productive fruit, until the scion of faith is matured and grown strong: for in the fourth year, since time is needed also for the person under instruction, the quartet of virtues (i. e. spiritual states) is consecrated to God, “the third νονη uniting the neophyte to the fourth hypostasis of the Lord.”

The word νονη u accented in the manuscript, and is take by Potter (the early eighteenth-century editor), as if it were the adjective “only”; and Potter displays amazing ingenuity in his effort to make sense of the passage. It remained for Dr. Brigg to perceive that the accentuation was at fault, and that what Clement intended was the noun, which means ‘halting place’ in the Imperial post road, ‘stage,’ or ‘mansio.’ Accordingly, he explained the passage as describing three stages or mansiones, which, joining on to the ‘Person’ of the Lord, in the fourth place, make up the quartet of spiritual states through which the neophyte has to pass before becoming a mature disciple. It seems, however, clear from the instances which have quoted above, that the word hypostasis is not used in this comparatively early context for the Person of Christ. Hypostasis, in fact, is here simply a synonym for νονη: after the neophyte has passed the three preliminary mansiones or stages, he reaches the fourth and final station, which is the goal of his journey, the bosom of Christ. We need therefore not concern ourselves to argue that Clement employed a characteristically post-Nicene phrase so long before Nicaea.

Connected with this intransitive sense is a further meaning, of which the root idea is that of basis or foundation. Hence hypostasis comes to mean the raw material, stuff, or ‘matter’ out of which an object is constructed, and on which its particular form is imposed by the designer or craftsman.  Thus, in the Epistle to Diognetus (2.1),2 the reader is asked to consider of what hypostasis or of what form they are whom the heathen regard as gods; one is made of stone like the roads underfoot, another is made of bronze, like the cooking pots in the kitchen, another is made of wood which is rotten, another is made of silver which requires a guard for its protection, another is made of iron which rusts, and another is made of earthenware the uses of which are too dishonourable to mention. Or again, Cyril of Jerusalem (cat. 9.10)3 observes that in a single tree the same hypostasis, drawing on the same physical elements of rain and soil, produces one part designed for giving shelter and another for various fruits. Or Chrysostom (ad Theod. laps 1.14), commenting on physical beauty, remarks that its hypostasis is nothing else but heat and blood and fluid.

Hence, hypostasis comes to mean content or substance in general. Irenaeus refers (haer. 1.15.5)5 to certain Gnostic alphabetical speculations, and says that the being and hypostasis of their divinity was botched up by them out of a multitude of letters, and they were not better craftsmen than Daedalus who constructed the labyrinth. Hippolytus (ref. 1.8.5)6 says that rivers derive their hypostasis from the rainfall. Origen questions (c. Cels 6.71)7 whether the soul of man should be resolved into fire or into hypostasis of angels. And Cyril of Jerusalem (cat. 9.5)8 interprets the Book of Genesis meaning that God reared the sky like a dome and formed the stable hypostasis of heaven out of the fluid nature of the primordial waters.

In connection with theology, a certain use is made of this conception as applied to the content substance of God, corresponding to what in the case of ordinary objects constitutes their determinate extension. The principal factor in causing the application of this conception to God was probably the text Heb. i.3 (“who being the effulgence of his glory and the expression of his hypostasis”), which appears to have caused considerable exegetical difficulty as soon as hypostasis began to be defined as a theological term. Origen quotes it (de princ. 4.4.1), asking at what time the image of the ineffable hypostasis of the Father was not in existence. Athanasius (c. Ar. 2.32)9 inquires who dares to say that the ‘expression’ is different from the hypostasis, and the author of the fourth discourse against the Arians (ch. 33)10 says that the ‘prophet’ clearly proclaimed that the Father’s hypostasis belonged to Christ. Elsewhere Athanasius (ad Afr. 4)11 lays it down that hypostasis means ‘being’ (ousia) and has no other significance than simply “that which exists”; the hypostasis and being mean existence, for it is, and it exists.

Epiphanius, replying to the argument of the Arians that homoousios (consubstantial) was an unscriptural term, and to their question which of the apostles mentions ‘being’ (ousia) of God, asks them (haer. 69.72)12 if they do not know that hypostasis and ousia have exactly the same sense; for in His hypostasis the Lord ‘is,’ and the effulgence of His glory and expression of His hypostasis likewise; quoting the Tetragrammaton, “I Am sent me unto you,” he adds ‘He that is’ means the absolute being (τὸ ὄν), and absolute beings means existent ousia. Again (anc. 6.5)13, he says that the term homoousios implies the existence of a single hypostasis, yet expresses the fact that the Father is enhypostatos (concretely individual) and the Son enhypostatos and the Spirit enhypostatos. In speaking of a single hypostasis, Epiphanius here is clearly not employing the term in the ordinary technical post-Nicene sense, but the use he makes of it is interesting as illustrating in what sense substance was ascribed to God. The ‘substance’ of God means the divine ‘content,’ whether the actual term employed is ousia or hypostasis. To the mind of the Fathers, down to the time at which the terminology became fixed and technical, the practical meaning of the two terms was substantially identical. They both indicated, to take the inevitable physical metaphor, the particular material stuff which constitutes a given object; and neither term is used in a generic sense.

In the case of the ordinary subject of experience, such as, for instance, the Matterhorn, the stuff or substance of which it is made is simply synonymous with the object itself.  The certain weight of the rock and glacier, with ascertainable height and shape and volume, is the Matterhorn; and nothing which is Matterhorn is anything else that Matterhorn.  Complications arose in theology because if Christianity is true, the same stuff or substance of deity in the concrete has three distinct presentations__not just three mutually defective aspects presented in three separate points of view, in the sense that the Matterhorn has a northern face and an eastern face and an Italian face, but three complete presentations of the whole and identical object, namely God, which are nevertheless objectively distinct from one another.  The theological problem of the Trinity was to stereotype terms which should give clear expression to this divine paradox which was also the Christian truth.

In the beginning, as has been said, hypostasis and ousia amounted to the same thing. There was, however, another and much more frequent use of hypostasis, in which the emphasis was different. It is important to remember that this second is the normal sense.  Ousia means a single object of which the individuality is disclosed by means of internal analysis, an object abstractly and philosophically a unit.  But in the sense of hypostasis to which we shall now turn, the emphasis lay not on content, but on externally concrete independence: objectivity, that is to say, in relation to the other objects. Thus, when the doctrine of the Trinity finally came to be formulated as one ousia in three hypostaseis it implied that God, regarded from the point of view of internal analysis, is one object; but that, regarded from the point of view of external presentation, He is three objects; His unity being safeguarded by the doctrine that these three objects of presentation are not merely precisely similar, as the semi-Arians were early willing to admit, but, in a true sense, identically one. The sum ‘God+God+God’ adds up, not to ‘3 Gods,’ but simply to ‘God,’ because the word God, as applied to each Person distinctly, expresses a Totum and Absolute which is incapable of increment either in quantity or in quality. (Cf. Maximus Conf. ambig. 105(b).)

The ground of hypostasis in this connection is the active sense of support or resistance. Thus in a late document it is actually used to paraphrase στήριγμα (buttress).  Hesychius of Jerusalem (on psalm cv. 16) after quoting the verse cited (“he brake the whole buttress of bread”),remarks “that is to say, the whole hypostasis of food,” and observes that another translator gave the reading “staff.” Hypostasis here clearly means that which props or stays, and this is pretty certainly its meaning in Ruth i.12 LXX (“if I should say, I have hypostasis of getting an husband, and should bear sons; would ye tarry till they were grown?”) where it expresses hop or confidence. Patristic instances of this precise sense seem to be rare, but a very good one may be found in John of Eubaea (in SS. Innoc. 2, Migne 96. 1504B) “I have no other hope or hypostasis except this babe alone.”

Hypostasis occurs more frequently in the sense of firmness, obduracy, or persistence.  In the New Testament this seems to be the sense in 2Cor. xi 17, ” I speak foolishly in the hypostasis of boasting,” Heb. iii. 14, “If we hold fast the beginning of our hypostasis firm unto the end.” In the Fathers we may quote the Epistle of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons (ap. Eus. h.e 5.1.20), where it said that the martyr Sanctus set the battle against the persecutors with such hypostasis that he refused even to state his own name; and the writer Apollonius (ib. 5.18.10), who states that, in exposing a disciple Montanus, named Alexander, he also exposes the  hypostasis of the ‘prophet’ his master. From meaning support or stay, hypostasis has come to signify endurance and stiffening, or, in the last instance quoted, brass-fronted impudence.  It may be mentioned, in illustration of the extent to which this sense of the word hypostasis has passed without notice, that quite recent scholars have entirely missed the point of the passage last quoted.

The next sense to be distinguished is that of “objectification,” as in Hebrews xi. i, “faith is the hypostasis of things hoped for”: R. V. margin, “the giving substance to,” is not far from the mark. Thus Tatian (ad Gr.21.3) says that the gods of the heathen, such as Hera or Athene, were not, in the opinion of Metrodorus of Lampsacus (who wrote a book about Homer that Tatian thought silly), in the least what people thought who had established temples in their honour, but were mere allegories, ‘objectifications’ of Nature, and decorative representations of the elements. Nilus (ad Eul. II), referring to the text in Hebrews, defines faith as the hypostasis of better things, made in hope of permanence, and Maximus the Confessor (quaest. ad Thal. 57, 192A) remarks that the hypostasis (realisation) of prayer and petition is their fulfilment by exercise of the virtues.

From this use the term derives the sense of productive or effective agency, source, or ground. Tatian (ad Gr. 5.1) calls God the hypostasis of the universe: Irenaeus (haer. 1.1.2) refers to the primo-generative ogdoad of Valentinus as the root and hypostasis of all things, and Origen (on St John 2.24, 156) calls the true Life which is imparted to rational men the hypostasis of light of knowledge.  Hence hypostasis comes to be used in the sense of origination or creation.  Irenaeus (haer. 2.14.16) distinguishes between the sources ‘substitutio’ (presumably a literal equivalent in Latin for hypostasis) and those of sensible and material existence. The passage is obscure, but it is possible that Irenaeus is referring to the distinction recognised in the Valentinian system, and recorded by Hippolytus (ref. 6.30.8), between the male element in creation, which was responsible for the form of objects, and the female element, which was responsible for their material substance, and is contrasting the act by which objects are barely caused to come into existence with the process which gives them sensible content. Origen in a fragment on Genesis (quoted by Eusebius prep. ev. 7.20, 335B), asks how it is possible to measure the vast extent of elemental substratum sufficient for the hypostasis (creation) of such a universe as this. Eusebius (laud. Const. I.5) uses the phrase, “before the entire hypostasis of visible objects.” Cyril of Jerusalem (cat. 7.5) says that God enjoyed the title of Father and the existence of His Son before all hypostasis and before all sensation, before times and before all ages. Basil even uses the term of the eternal process which constitute the distinct being of the Holy Spirit and of the Son, arguing (c. Eun. 2.32) that the whole power of the Father has been set in motion for the begetting of the Son, in turn, the whole power of the of the Only begotten for the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit; and again (ib. 2.13), that there is no interval between the being of the Father and the Son, and that no thought is elder than the hypostasis of the Only-begotten. In the pseudonymous work, de hom. str. (2.1) which goes under Basil’s name, the term is applied to the creation of the mankind in the phrase, “our bodily hypostasis and formation.”

Finally, from creation the term derives the sense of the constitutive principle, the inherent law by which objects in their creation were designed to function. Thus Athenagoras (supp. 24.4) says that fallen angels insulted the hypostasis and origin of their being. Irenaeus (haer.  5.13.3), in speaking of the resurrection of the flesh, refers to the transformation by which it, though mortal and corruptible, becomes immortal and incorruptible, not of its own hypostasis, but by the action of the Lord. Clement (strom. 7.17, 107.5) claims the historic Catholic Church, as opposed to the plurality of heresies, was by its hypostasis and purpose of the origin one. Origen (on St John 20.21, 174) says that the devil is falsehood, not by his hypostasis, by constitution, but because he became such by a process of change and of his own will. And other instances could be quoted to much the same effect.

We now come to the sense in which hypostasis has its chief importance for theology. In contrast to the imaginative conceit or picturesque unreality, it expresses the perdurability and objective resistance of solid fact. Like Dr Johnson, hypostasis vanquishes Berkeley with a kick. It is used not frequently in the phrase ‘hypostasis of ousia,’ which may be translated ‘substantial objectivity,’ or ‘the reality of solid fact.’ Irenaeus (haer. 3.6.4), where he is defining the different senses in which two objects may be said to be separated. An object, he says, can be separated from another object by process and hypostasis; or in thought, or in process, but not by hypostasis. The illustration he gives of first is when wheat and barley are mixed together, and then separated out; they can be said to be distinguished by the fact they have been sorted out into separate piles, and by the fact that the piles are physically distinct objects. But things can be separated by process without being separated by hypostasis, when the element which is take aways has no ‘hypostasis of substance.’ The illustration that he give is when the form of a statue, representing a man or a horse, is separated from the matter by the bronze being melted down: the form is abolished altogether, it has no ‘objectivity of substance.’ Eusebius discusses the theory (c. Marcell. 2.4.25) that the living Son of God operated in the incarnate Jesus by external action (energia) and not in hypostasis of ousia, that is to say, the Logos merely influenced a man, instead of Himself becoming incarnate in him. Later, hypostasis alone acquires the sense of ‘reality,’ or ‘genuineness,’ as in Epiph. hear. 69.1, “not in irony but in truth . . . that He may show the true hypostasis of the flesh;” Macarius Magnes 2.9, “he says this by way of indicating the hypostasis of His own Godhead”; and pseudo-Athanasius confut. propos. 13, “showing that nothing in Christ should be taken as according to phantasm, but everything according to hypostasis and truth.”

Hypostasis comes to mean positive and concrete and distinct existence, first of all in the abstract, and later, as will be seen, in the particular individual. According to Clement (strom. 2.7, 35.1), St Paul laid it down that knowledge of sin had been revealed through the Law, not that sin had taken hypostasis by that means. Origen (c. Cels. 8.12) says that we worship the Father of truth and the Son who is the Truth, being two objects in hypostasis, but one in concord. Alexander of Alexandria (ap. Thdt. h.e. I.4.38), quoting the text, “I and the Father are one,” says that in these words the Lord does not proclaim Himself to be the Father, nor does He represent as one the natures which are two in hypostasis. Athanasius (c. Gent. 6) observes that certain Greek thinkers have erroneously maintained the existence of evil in hypostasis and of itself, in other words, have ascribed to ti an independent and positive reality. Cyril of Jerusalem (cat. 11.10) says that the Word was not a word-expressed, but an enhypostasis Word, begotten out of the Father in hypostasis. Innumerable further instances could be quoted from the writers of the fourth century, in which hypostasis expresses the character of concrete objectivity.

The adjective enhypostatos has a corresponding sense, meaning simply ‘that which has an objective individual existence,’ unlike an accident or attribute or other mental abstraction which is not a concrete object or thing. In the language of the mediaeval Scholastics, an object would be enhypostasis which possessed both substance and accidents. It seems to occur first in Irenaeus frag. 19, which is a comment on the command to Moses to take as his successor Joshua the Son of Nun (Numbers xxvii. 18). He says’ if this is a genuine fragment of Irenaeus, that it was necessary for Moses to lead the nation out of Egypt, but for Joshua to lead them into their inheritance; and that Moses, like the Law, should enter into rest, but Joshua, as word, true type of the enhypostasis Word, should address the nation. The term here differentiates the divine Word, who is a substantive being, from the spoken word which was addressed to the people. It next appear in Origen’s notes on Deuteronomy xvi. 19-20, where Christ is called the enhypostasis Wisdom and Word of God the Father. Cyril of Jerusalem (cat. 17.5). speaks similarly of the Holy Spirit as being not a spirit breathed from the mouth, but enhypostatos. From this point the word is of common occurrence in Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Epiphanius and other writers.

Hypostatikos is occasionally used in the same sense, apparently in connection with its earlier sense of ‘tending to support,’ or ‘creative.’ Some third or fourth century instances can occasionally be quoted of hypostatos with exactly the same meaning, the most telling example occurring in Hippolytus (ref. 7.18.1-2). Being, says Hippolytus, is distinguished under three heads, genus, species and individual; as an instance of genus, he takes the word animal, and of species the word man, as being already distinguished from all other animal types, but still a yet unindividualised, and not het formed into an ‘hypostatos ousia’; to arrive at this result, he take a particular man and calls him Socrates, that is what he means by an individual (atomon), and that is what Aristotle “primary and particularly and most properly calls and ousia.

As expressive of a concrete instance or substance, an object, thing or fact of presentation, hypostasis appears to occur first in a collective sense. Thus in Irenaeus (haer. 1.5.4) there is a reference to the demiurge and “all the rest of the psychic hypostasis,” including both the irrational beasts and man. In the same section he speaks of the devil and the the demons and the angels and “all the spiritual hypostasis of wickedness.” Cyril of Jerusalem (cat. 6.13), arguing about the problem of evil, puts the question whether God is powerful or powerless; if the former, how does evil come into existence against His will, and how comes the wicked hypostasis to arise? And Serapion (sacr. 13.2) addresses God as being incomprehensible to the whole created hypostasis. This use is admittedly rare, but sufficient instances have collected to suggest that, in the cases quoted above, hypostasis means totality either of existent things or of some particular class of existent things.

On the other hand, very many instances can be found in which hypostasis represents particular objects or individuals. Quoting the Gnostic Monoimus, one of the specialists of arithmetical cosmology, Hippolytus observes (ref. 8.13.2) that certain  combinations of numbers become bodily hypostaseis. Clement (strom. 4.22, 136.4), speaking of knowledge, observes the apprehension; and permanent apprehension, by becoming, through continuous fusion, the substance of the knower and perpetual contemplation, remains a living hypostasis. This appears to mean that knowledge becomes so bound up with the being of the knowing subject as to constitute a permanent entity. Origen (de princ. 3.1.22) refers to individual rational beings as “rational hypostaseis,” in contrast to the single lump of soul-matter out of which God has composed them. Eusebius (prep. ev. II.16, 535A) mentions the composition of Plotinus on the subject of “the three hypostaseis” (facts or elements recognised in metaphysics). It is very probable that the anathema of the creed of Nicaea against those who asserted that the Son came into existence from the nonexistent, or from another hypostasis or ousia, means by these last two expressions, not the generic substance, but individual objective source. At any rate, later condemnations by their turn of phrase suggest this inference__such as those of the council of Antioch, quote by Athanasius (de syn. 25 and 26), which were directed against people who say that the Son who was nonexistent, or from some other hypostasis, and not from God; or the statement of the latter that He was not of any other pre-existing hypostasis beside the Father, but begotten out of God alone. Since “God” is obviously a hypostasis, in the sense of object, and not in that of generic substance, the “other hypostasis” may well be thought to indicate a similar object. Again, Basil (de Spi. sanct. 41) ridicules the idea that the supreme God is an abstract genus, such as may only be distinguished in thought but has no existence in any hypostasis.`.

1.Clement Strom 2.18: εἴν δ’ ἂν οὑτος ὁ τῆς γεωργίας τύπος διδασκαλίας τρόπος, διδάσκων δείν τὰς παραφύσεις τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἐπικόπτειν καὶ τὰς συναναθαλλούσας τῷ γονίμῳ ματαίας τῆς πίστεως.  τῷ [τε] γὰρ τετάρτῳ ἔτει ἑπεὶ καὶ χρόνου χρεία τῷ κατηχουμένῳ βεβαίως, ἡ τετρὰς τῶν ἀρετῶμ καθιεροῡται τῷ θεῷ, τῆς τρίτης ἤδη μονῆς συναπτούσης ἐπὶ τὴν τοῡ κυρίου τετάρτην ὑπόστασιν.

2.  Epistle to Diognetus: Ἄγε δή, καθάρας σεαυτὸν ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν προκατεχόντων σου τὴν διάνοιαν λογισμῶν καὶ τὴν ἀπατῶσάν σε συνήθειαν ἀποσκευασάμενος καὶ γενόμενος ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς καινὸς ἄνθρωπος, ὡς ἂν καὶ λόγον καινοῦ, καθάπερ καὶ αὐτὸς ὡμολόγησας, ἀκροατὴς ἐσόμεονος· ἴδε μὴ μόνον τοῦς ὀφθαλμοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ φρονήσει, τίνος ὑποστάσεως ἢ τίνος εἴδους υγχάνουσιν, οὓς ἐρεῖτε καὶ νομίζετε θεούς.

3. Clement Strom, 9.10: Ἐξ ἑνὸς γὰρ ὑετοῡ ταῠτα καὶ μιᾱς τῆς τῆς, τίς ὁ δημιουργῶν; θεώρησόν μου τὴν ἁκριδσιαν· ἑκ μιᾱς ὑποστάσεως τοῡ δένόρου, τὸ μέν εἰς σχεπην, τό δέ εἰς καρποὐς διαψόρευς· καὶ ὀ τεχνίτες

5. Irenaeus Haer 1.15.5: χωρποῡντα Πατέρα, ἀώρητον δὲ ὒπάρχοντα, εἰς τετράδα, καὶ ὀγδοάδα, καὶ δεκάδα, καὶ δωδεκάδα ὑπομεριζοντος, καὶ διἀ τῶν τοιούτων πολυτλασιασμῶν τὸ ἂῤῤητον καὶ ἀνεννότον, ώς σὐ φὴς, τοῡ Πατρὸς ἐκδιηγουμένου; Καὶ ὃν ἀσώματον καὶ ἀνούσιον ὀμομάζεις, τὴν τούτου οὐσιαν καὶ τὴν ὑποστασιν ἐκ πολλῶν γραμμάτων, ἑτέρων ἐξ ἑτέρων γεννωμένων κατασχευάζεισ’ αὐτὸς Δαίδαλος ψευδὴς

6. Hippolytus Against all Heresies 1.8.5: τοὺς δὲποταμοὺς καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ὂμβρων λαμβάνειν τὴν ὑποστασιν καὶ ἐξ ὐδάτων τ&ν ἐν τῇ γῇ· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτὴν καίλην καὶ ἒχειν ὕδωρ ἐν τοῑς κοιλώμασιν.

7. Origen Con Cels 6.71: ἐκπυρούτωσαν· ἡμεἴς δὲ ἀσώματον οὐσίαν οὐκ ἵσμεν ἐκπυρουμένην, οὐδ εἱς πῡρ ἁναλυομένην τὴν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν, ἢ τὴν ἀλλέλων ἢ θρόνωνἢ κυριστήτων ἢ αρχῶν ἢ ἐξουσιῶν ὑποστασιν

8. Cyril of Jerusalem Cat 9.5: Τί γὰρ ἔξουσι μέμψασθαι τῷ μεγίστψ δημιουργήματι τοῡ θεοῡ; οῡς ἔδει ἐκπλαγῆναι θεωρήσαντας τῶν οὐρανῶν τά κύτη· οῡς ἔδει προσκυνῆσαι τὸν στήσαντα ώς καμάραν τὸν οὐρανόν· τὸν ἐκ ῤευτῆς φύσεως τῶν ὑδάτον ἀπτωτον ὑπόστασιν οὑρανοῡ ποιήσαντα.

9. Contra Arianos 2.32: Ἤ ἤ τίς τολμᾴ λέγιεν ἀλλότριον εἶναι τὸν χαρακτῆρα ὐποστασεως;

10. Contra Arianos 4.33: πῶς δὲ καὶ κληθειν Χριστὸς φιλος ἄνθρωπος; ἠνωμένος δὲ τῷ λόγῳ εἰκοτωσ· χρηματίζοι Χριστὸς καὶ υἱὸς θεοῡ, ἄνωθεν τοῡ προφίτου σαφῶς ἐκβοήσαντος τὴν πατρικὴν ὐπόστασιν περὶ αὐτοῡ

11. Ad Afros 4: οὕτοι δὲ καὶ ἅπαξ καὶ δεύτερον καθαιρεθέντες, καὶ τρίτον ἐν αὐτῆ τῇ Ἀριμήνῳ, γράπειν ἐτόλνησαν, μὴ χρῆναι λέγειν οὐσίαν ἣ ὐπόστασιν ἔχειν τὸν θεόν. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων σκοπεῑν ἐξεστιν, ἀδελφοὶ, ὡς οἱ μὲν ἐν Νιχαια τῶ Γραφῶν πνέουσια, Λέγοντος αὐτοῡ τοῡ θεοῡ ἐν μὲν τῇ Ἐξόδψ· Ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὤ· διὰ τοῡ Ἱερεμίου· Τις ἐστιν ἐν ὑποστήματι αὐτοῡ, καὶ εἶδε τὸν λόγον αὐτοῡ; καὶ μετ’ ὀλίγου· καὶ εἰ ἕστησν ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει μου, καὶ ἤκουσαν τῶν λόγων μου. Ἡ δὲ ὑπόστασις οὐσια ἐστι, και οὐδεν ἄλλο ον μαινόμενον ἐχει ἢ αὑτὸ τό ὅν· ὅπερ Ἱερεμίας ὑπαρξιν ὀνομάζει λέγων· Καὶ οὐξ ἤκουσαν φωνὴν ὑπάρξεως. Ἡ γὰρ ὑπόστασις καὶ ἡ οὐσια ὕπαρξίς ἐστιν.

12. Epiphanius Against all Heresies 69.72: Πάλιν δὲ προφαδίζονται, τὸ ἰατικον τοῡτο φάρμακον καὶ σωτηρῶδες ἀντιδοτον ἀφ’ ἑαυτῶν ἀποβάλλεσθαι βουλόμενοι, τὸ στερέμνιον τῆς πίστεως τῆς ἁγιας ἐκκλησίας, λέγοντες, Πόθεν τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ὂνομα ἡμῑν; διὰ τὶ ὁμοούσιος ὁ υἱὸς τῷ πατρὶ λέγεται; ποία γραφὴ εἶπε περὶ ὁμοουσιότητος; ποῑος τῶν ἀποστόλων οὑσίαν εἶπε θεοῡ; οὐκ ἴσασι δὲ ὅτι καὶ οὐσία ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ λόγῳ. Ἔστι γὰρ κύριος ἐν τῇ ὑπόστασει αὐτοῡ, καὶ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης, καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῡ. Οὐσία οὖν ἐστιν οὐχὶ περιουσία, ἀλλὰ αὐτὸ ὂν, ὥς φησι Μωυσῆς, Ὁ ὢν ἀπέσταλκέ με, εἰπὼν τοῑς υἱοῑς Ἰσρεήλ. Ὁ ὣ οὖν ἐστι τὸ ὂν, τὸ δὲ ὂν οὖσα οὐσία τυγχάνει. Τὸ δὲ Ὁμοῡ οὐχ ἑνα πάλιν σημαίνει, ἀλλὰ ἐπὸ τοῦ ὁμοουσὶου δύο σημαίνει τέλεια·

13. Epiphanius anc 6.5: ὅπου γὰρ ὁμοούσιον, μιᾱς ὑποστάσις ἑστι δηλωτιξόν· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνὑπόστατον σημαίνει τὸν πατέρα καί ἐνυπόστατον τὸυ υἱὸν καὶ ἐνυπόστατον τὸ πνεῡμα τὸ ἅγιον. ὅταν δέ τις ὁμοούσιον λέγῃ, οὐκ ἀλλότριον τῆς αὐτῆς θεότητος σημαίνει.