Footnotes to Two Ancient Christologies

1. It is outside the scope of this essay to enter into a full discussion of the teaching of Didymus the Blind (died 398), who for some time had been head of the catechetical school of Alexandria. We may however, briefly note that this admirer of Origen, who, as is clear, has nothing new to offer in the field of Christology, and whose doctrine is much less developed than that of Athanasius [for, as he has been shown, while Athanasius stands in the midst of the movement, and treats Christology directly, didymus stands outside of it, and treats this subject only by the way__see E Weigl, Christologie vom Tode des Athanasius bis zum Ausbruch des nestorianischen Streites (373-429) (München, 1925)], upholds the two foundation principles of the Alexandrine teaching. Like Athanasius, he starts from the soteriological point of view (see esp. de Trin. iii. 4, 5; PG xxxix. 829D, 836D, 841C), and affirms that the only-begotten God Himself become man on our behalf (de Trin. iii. 4; PG xxxix. 828D), and,through mixing earthly things with heavenly, has established for us perpetually a new salvation (ibid.; PG xxxix. 840A). Again and again does Didymus affirm that the Logos has become man “without change”. It is noteworthy, too, that he upholds the principle of the divine self-emptying, and in this connection this statement of his will be regarded as praiseworthy: . . . συγκαταβὰς εἰς πάντα, καὶ πτωχεύων τῇ τοῡ δούλου μορφῇ, και μεταπλάσας τῷ λόγῳ ἑαυτόν ἀτρέπτος εἰς τὸ κοινόν, καὶ πᾱσαν τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως ἀκολουθὶαν φυλάττων, καὶ μηδὲν τοῡ χαρακτῆρος τῆς  ἁληθείας ἀφανιζων (de Trin. iii. 21; PG xxxix. 901C). His teaching on the union is deficient: he does not use the terms μὶζις, κρᾱσις, σύγκρασις, συνάφεια which were in common use among the representatives of the Alexandrine school of thought, and even ἕνωσις does not appear as a current term in his writings; neither do we find here any reference to an “essential” union, or to the truth that in the Incarnation the Logos made the manhood “His own” (see Weigl, pp. 110, 113). At the same time, it is plain that, through the expression  ἕν πρόσωπον may be used only once (ibid. p. 109) though Didymus would strenuously maintain the doctrine of the unity of Christ’s Person against the idea of ᾱλλος . . . ᾱλλος: the Apostle Peter was not thinking of “two” when he wrote that Christ suffered in the flesh (de Trin. iii. 6; PG xxxix. 844A, B); the Logos who became man is είς καὶ ὁ αὐτός (de Trin, ii. 8; PG xxxix 589A). Again, true to his upbringing, this teacher emphasizes the truth that this Person is “God”: he alludes to the Virgin as “‘Theotokos,” and ascribes two births to the Logos (for references, see Weigl, p. 105 nn. 2, 4.)__through he does not stop to explain what is meant, and what is not meant, when onε speaks in this way. It should be observed, too, that Didymus would distinguish between the Logos in His eternal being and the Logos as incarnate: his interpretation of the proof-texts of the Arians is based on this principle, and especially interesting are his statements that “the Logos, as He knew and willed, tasted death in the flesh, and continued immortal, even then (καί τότε) bestowing life upon all,” and that He continued καὶ ἀπαθὴς τῇ θεότητι καὶ ἐν τοῑς παθήμασιν (de Trin. iii. 21; PG xxxix. 905B, 912B).

It is equally clear that the second doctrinal principle of the Alexandrine school is at the root of Didymus’ Christology. Though he never uses the expression δύο φύσεις , it is certain that for him Jesus Christ consists of two elements__Christ is ἄνθρωπος ἅμα καὶ θεός (Frag. in Act. Ap., PG xxxix. 1657A)__which are in Him “without confusion”: the Son of God, he says, is shown κατὰ τό ἐξ ἀμφοῑν (de Tin. iii. 22; PG xxxix. 916A), again and again does he affirm that the Son became man ἀσυγχύτως (for references, see Weigl, p. n.10).  He most emphatically rejects the doctrine that the Incarnation was a φάντασμα (de Trin. iii. 10; PG xxxix. 857B), or that that Christ’s body was only in appearance (de Trin. iii. 21; PG xxxix. 904A) or that the body was from heaven and not human (de Trin. iii. 8; PG xxxix 849C). We must notice, too, that, against the Arian doctrine of a σὰρξ ἄψυχος, he insists that Christ’s was a σὰρξ ἐμψυχος (de Trin. iii. 21; PG xxxix. 904A), and is evident from his appeal to Scripture__himself, presumably, prepared to take the trichotomous view of man’s constitution (see de Spir. S., 55, 59; PG xxxix. 1080B, 1082B)__ that he would say that the manhood possessed freedom of choice; this he can speak of “the will of manhood” (de Trin. iii. 12; 806B).  It may be that he even uses such expressions as ψυχὴ λογική or ψυχὴ νοερά__though these occur in the Exposito in Psalmos, which contains the statements to be fond word for word in Diodore of Tarsus and Eustathius of Antioch (See Weigl, p. 101 n. 3), and such words as: . . . ἢν ἥνωσεν ἑαυτῷ σάρκα ἑμψυχωμένην ψυχῇ λογικῇ τε καὶ νοερᾷ (in Ps. lxxi. 5; PG xxxix. 1465c) certainly have a Cyrilline flavour (see below, p.102 n. 5); moreover, it is significant that Didymus never mentions Apollinarius by name__a point which seems to show that he paid no close attention to the question at issue. But, even if Didymus would uphold the principle of complete reality of the Lord’s manhood, he, like the Greek theologians, never applies it: he quotes Heb, v. 7,8, but merely says that the Son of God “accepted obedience” and took away the former disobedience (de Trin. iii. 21: PG xxxix. 916B); and in his explanation of the prayer of Gethsemane, he says that the Lord brought to light the fear of death which was present with Him, in order that the devil, who had drawn nigh in the Wilderness when the Saviour spoke of things proper to manhood, and had fled when, through His wonders, He had shown Himself to be God, might consider Him a mere man, and not God appearing in flesh, and be himself hurt who was cunningly devising to hurt the unconquerable God (ibid.; PG xxxix. 980A, B).

2. See Prestige, op. cit. p. 157.

3. For instance, see Driver and Hodgson, Bazaar of Heracleides, Appendix III, pp. 406f. For a discussion on the use of “prosopon” by the Antiochenes, see below, pp. 156ff

4. Pp. 162ff

5. Thus Athanasius in a well-known passage, says that “hypostasis” means “being” (“ousia”), and that it has no other significance than simply αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν (Ad Afos 4).

6. Cf.the distinction between “ousia” and “hypostasis” (in “Theology”) made of Basil of Ceasarea: ” ‘ousia’ has the same relations to ‘hypostasis’ as the common to the particular” (Ep. ccxiv, ccxxxvi)__a patristic text to which appeal could be made in support of the use of “hypostasis” in the sense of “person.”

7.  Ep. iii Ad Nestor., PG Ixxvii. 116A; Apol. Adv. Theod. i., ed. P E Pusey, S Cyrilli archeipisc . . . (Oxford, 1868-77),vi. p. 396.

8. Thus Origen can say that In relation to the Father the Son is ἕτερος κατ’ οὐσίαν καὶ ὑποκείμενον  (de Orat. 15). Cf asp his use of the phrase οὑσία ἰδία (Comm. in Johan. ii. 6, ed. Brooke, i. p. 70). Again, νοεραὶ οὑσία are for him the same as λογικαὶ ὑποστάσεις (de Princ. II. ix. I; III. i 22). For a similar usage in Dionysius of Alexandria and Pierius, see Raven, op. cit. p. 64 n. 4.

9. See above p. 28.

10. See below, p. 53. n. 2 (note 30).

11. See below pp. 52f.

12. Thus the usage “ousia”=”prosopon” is to be found among the Monophysites Timothy Aelurus (see J. Lebon, “La Christologie de Timothée Aelure,” in Revue d’Hist ecclés., t. ix, pp. 692, 694), Severus of Antioch (see PG lxxxvi. 924A, 1921B), and Julian of Halicarbassus (see r Draguet, Julien d’Halicarnasse, append., Fragmenta Dogmatica, p. 62 Frag. 72), using as equivalents the terms “ousia”, “nature”, and “hypostasis”. Presumably the Monophysites adopted this usage because it was already to be found in the Apollinarian writings which constituted one of their main sources of appeal; besides, as Harnack says, “in the course of the transition from the fifth to the sixth century, Aristotelianism once more became the fashion in science.”

13. See de synod. 50, 52, 53 and c. Arian. iii. 65, where Athanasius uses “nature” to explain what he understood by “ousia” and “hypostasis” (=substantia).

14. It is noteworthy that the Anomoeans were using “nature” in the sense of “prosopon” at the same time as Apollinarius. See the Creed of Eudoxius, who died in 370 (Hahn, pp. 261f.) and the statement of Lucius, who was made bishop of Alexandria in 374 (quoted by Raven, op. cit. p. 116).

15. Thus__to quote examples of the Alexandrine’s us of “nature” in the sense of substantia__we find in Apollinarius: “human nature” (de Un. 11, Lietzmann, Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule, p. 190) and “our nature” (Anaceph. 23, ibid. p. 244). Further, writing against Diodore of Tarsus, the Laodicene says that Christ’s body in its union with Godhead does not alter from being a body, “just as a man’s body remains in its own nature” (ibid. Frag. 134). Cf, also the statement (to be found in his argument that it would mean the destruction of a self-determinating being if it were to lose its of self-determination) that God has destroyed “the nature” which He Himself created (Apod., ibid Frag. 87). Or turning to Cyril, we have: “the divine nature” (Apol., adv. theod. i; Scolia, xxviif; ed Pusey, VI. pp. 396, 548, 556); “the nature of the Godhead (de Recta Fide and Reg. Rom. v. 18f.; de Recta Fide ad Reg. (ii): ed. Pusey, VI. p. 548; III. p. 487; IV. p. 318; V. p. 186f.; VII. pt. i.p. 302); “human nature” (Apol. adv Theod. ii: ed. Pusey, VI. p. 404); “the same nature as ours” (Comm. in Jo. Ev. X. 14, 15, ed. Pusey, IV p. 232). Tixeront (History of Dogmas’ iii. p. 59) thinks that for this Alexandrine “the word ‘nature’ means a concrete and independent nature, i.e. a person”, and that “when he uses his own terminology, Cyril never calls the humanity (of Jesus Christ) ‘nature’ “__he had, rather, “to employ his opponents’ language, particularly when he had to prove that he admitted no confusion of the two elements in Jesus Christ.” But, as the instances taken from his Comm. in Jo. Ev. reveal, it is clear that Cyril uses “nature” in the sense of substantia in writings which are not controversial. The point would seem to be that we cannot speak of Cyril’s “own terminology”: he does but adopt a current terminology, according to which “nature” could be used in two senses. Apollinarius before him had used the term in this way, and a similar usage is to be found in those who followed him. (see, for instance, the explanation of the use of the term put forward by Severus of Antioch__quoted below, p. 50 n .1[note 16]).

16. An excellent illustration of the various ways in which the terms “hypostasis,” “ousia,” and “nature” were taken by the Alexandrine theologians is to be found in the letter of Severus of Antioch to Eupraxius the chamberlain (ed. and trans. by E. W. Brooks, A collection of Letters of Severus of Antioch, Patrologia Orientalis, t. xiv, fasc. i, pp. 28f.): We use the name nature sometimes generally of “ousia”, and sometimes specifically signifying the hypostasis of man. We term all mankind one nature, as in the text, “Every nature of beasts and of birds and of things that are in the water is subject to human nature’ (James iii. 7): and again we call a man ‘nature,’ Paul, for instance, or Peter, or James. Where we name all mankind one nature we use the name ‘nature’ generically in place of ‘ousia’, but when we speak of one nature of Paul, we employ the name ‘nature’ in place of ‘individual hypostasis.’ So also when we say that the Trinity is one nature, as in the text, ‘In order that we may be sharers in the divine nature’ (2 St Peter 1.4), we use the name ‘nature’ in place of the general designation ‘ousia’ . . . But, when we say ‘one incarnate nature of God the Word,’ we say ‘nature’ in place of an individual designation, and thereby denote one single hypostasis of the Word, like that of Paul, or Peter, or any single man. Therefore also, when we say ‘one nature of the Word Himself,’ and clearly denote that is is one hypostasis. But again let no one stain the divine nature that is raised above all things with anything lowly taken from the example of Paul and Peter. For, although these are of the same ousia, they differ not only in hypostasis but also in power and operation, and stature and shape, and in the various kinds of impulses that are in men’s minds. The Trinity, however, differs by the difference of hypostases only, and in every point is unvarying in equality, and in fact that it is of the same ousia.”

17. Ad Jov. 3, Lietzmann, op. cit. p. 253

18. Ad Jov. 2, Lietzmann, op. cit. p. 252

19. Ή Κατὰ Μέρος Πιστις, , Lietzmann, op. cit. p. 171

20. Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 138

21. Κ,Μ,Π. 36, Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 181.

22. Lietzmann op. cit. Frag. 133

23. De Un. 6, Lietzmann, op. cit. pp. 187f. (trans. as in Raven, Apollinarianism, p. 203).

24. Op. cit. pp. 202ff., where the subject is discussed at length.

25. C Diod., Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 124

26. Irenaeus adv. Haeres III. xix. 3

27. From Apollinarius, commentary on  St John__a fragment to be found in cramer, Cat., Graec. Patr. in NT. ii 315 (quoted by Raven op cit. p. 205.)

28. C. Diod., Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 127 (trans. as in Raven, op. cit. p. 205).

29. See below, p. 86

30. De Un. 2 Lietzmann, op. cit. p. 186.

31. See above, pp. 22, 29, for the use of those terms by Origen the Origenists. Apollinarius was, then, drawing upon common stock__the same stock used by the Cappadocians (see below, p. 96 n. 1).

32. Like all the Alexandrines, Apollinarius uses the word in the sense of unitio: τὰ πράγματα ἥνωται κατὰ τὴν τῆς σαρκὸς πρὸς θεότητα ἕνωσιν (De Un. 11, Lietzmann. op. cit. p. 191). See also Κ,Μ,Π. 2, Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 168, and Lietzmann op. cit. Frag. 164.

33. Ad Dion., 9 Lietzmann op. cit. p. 260.

34. C. Diod., Lietzmann, op. cit. Frags. 134, 137.

35. Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 164.

36. Ibid. Frag. 12 “That which has been inseparably joined to God,” Apollinarius says, is divine “on account of the personal union [διὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν τὴν οὐσιωδη]”. The same expression is to be found in Malchion the Sophist. (see above p. 28).

37. Ibid. frag. 36.

38. Here we can conveniently enquire into the standpoint of the Synousiasts or Polemianists, a section of the followers of the Laodicene who were representatives by such teachers as Polemon (or, Polemius), Timothy of Berytus, Eunomius of Beroea in Thrace, Julian, and Job, a bishop. These boldly asserted that the flesh of Christ is “homoouios” with God. Naturally they were misunderstood, and, even by other followers of Apollinarius, were condemned as upholders of the notion that in the union Christ’s manhood had become “of one essence” with His Godhead (see esp. the abusive criticism which they received from Valentinus, who, with Homonius, led the opposing section, in his Capita apologiae, Lietzmann, op cit. pp. 287ff).But the Polemianists’ was, certainly, not a doctrine of this order. It is to be noteworthy that Apollinarius himself more than once says that it is not to be thought that the Lord’s flesh is consubstantial with his Godhead (see his letter to Terentius the Comes at Antioch, Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 163, and the anathema at the end of the confession of the Apollinarians, Tom. Synod., Lietzmann, op. cit. p.263). Besides, these teachers themselves assert that the flesh remains flesh in the union. Timothy, while holding that it is “homoousios” with God, declares that it is human and “homoousios” with us (Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag 181); and Bishop Job anathematizes  those who would say that it is “homoousios” with “incorporeal ousia of the ineffable Father” (ibid. p. 287). In what sense, then, do the Polemianists use “homoousios”? For how, otherwise, it it possible to account for their emphatic condemnation of the doctrine of consubstantiality of Christ’s flesh with His Godhead? Timothy of Berytus in his letter to Homonius says that to deny that the flesh is συνουσιωμένη with the Logos is to destroy the unity of the one life and hypostasis, and to make the union that of a holy man with God (ibid. p. 278). Clearly the principle which they would lay down is that the “flesh”__and by this they mean a body and an animal soulis not “that of another besides the Logos”: holding that the flesh has its properties, and that these remain in the union (see their appeal to the words of Apollinarius on this subject in the same letter, ibid. p. 278), they maintain that these properties are not those of another “Person.” Their position is that Jesus Christ is one Person, the Logos Himself, who has made the flesh His ownthat flesh is, therefore, to counteract the notion that in Jesus Christ there are two parallel “ousiai” (two parallel personal existences)a holy man and the Logos. Their point is that the ousia of the Logos is the ousia of the fleshthat the flesh has “the same ousia” as the Logos. Of course this comes near to denying the reality of its individuating qualityand these teachers, following Apollinarius, took this stepbut his denial is not necessarily involved in the statement that the flesh is “homoousios” wiht the Logos: one can say, and be orthodox, that the “Person” of the Logos is the “Person” of the manhood, and been united to the Person of the Logos. And, we should suggest, it is this conception which the Synousiasts were meaning to uphold: against the Nestorian idea of two parallel existences (those of the Logos and a holy man), they were insisting on the idea of a “compositions”a composition of Godhead and flesh in the Person of the Logos. Undoubtedly, this use of “homoousios” is dangerous, though the Synousiasts (like those teachers at Corinth during the episcopate of Epictus who see to have been using the term in the same waysee above p. 36 n. 4) were hardly deserving of the condemnation which was meted out to them: they may have been unsound in their doctrine of the Lord’s manhood, but they realised the peril of Nestorianism, and saw that it could be overcome only through a firm insistence n the truth of the unity of His Person.

39. So Eunomius of Beroea, Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 178.

40. So Julian, also a Polemianist, ibid. Frag. 180. Bishop Job can say that Christ is “one composite hypostasis and prosopon” (ibid p. 286).

41. The celebrated formula is to be found in the ad Jovianum, 1 (Lietzmann, op. cit. p. 251), a work__in all probability that of Apollinarius himself__which was ascribed to Athanasius. On the way in which the expression would seem to have been built up, see below, p. 89 n. 2.

42. Syllog., Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 119; cf. also Frag. 158.

43. De Incarn., Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 9.

44. Ad Dion., Lietzmann, op. cit. p. 257.

45. Ibid. At the same time, it may be noted, Apollinarius is careful to explain to the Antiochenes that when he uses this analogy he has no thought of “confusing” the elements in Christ. Thus: “if man possesses both soul and body, and these remain in unity, much more does Christ, who possesses divinity and body, keep both constant and unconfounded” (c. Diod., Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 129).

46. Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 186. The words were attributed to Felix of Rome and accepted as such by Cyril, who makes use of them (see below, p. 90 n. 2). Cf. also Κ,Μ,Π. 28, (Lietzmann, op. cit. p. 177). where those are condemned who would worship τὸν ἐκ Μαρίας ἄνθρωπον ὡς ἔτερον ὄντα παρὰ τὸν ἐκ θεοῡ θεόν.

47. Anaceph. I, Lietzmann, op. cit. p. 242.

48. On Apollinarius’ denial that the flesh is homoousios with the Godhead, see esp. Raven, op. cit. pp. 217ff., where the apposite passages are set down.

49. De Fid. et Incarn. 5, Lietzmann, op. cit. p. 196; Ad Jov. 1, 2 Lietzmann, op.cit. pp. 25of.

50. Apod., Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 50.

51. Cf. Apod., Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 50, 52, 95.

52. Apod., Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 93.

53. Κ,Μ,Π. 11, Lietzmann, op. cit. p. 171.

54. Apollinarianism, pp. 203.

55. As we have tried to show, the same distinction is to be found in Origen, Malchion the Sophist, and Athanasius (above, pp. 22f., 29f., 39). It appears, too, in the Cappadocians and in Cyril (below, pp. 73f., 87f.).

56. De Fid. et Incarn. 6, Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 199.

57. C. Diod., Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 131.

58. De Manif., Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 109.

59. De Un. 7, Lietzmann, op. cit. p. 188.

60. De Incarn., Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 3.

61. Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 180. That Julian is here giving a faithful account of Apollinarius’ teaching is seen from the fragment of the letter which the master wrote to his disciple, ibid. Frag. 151.

62. Apod., Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 107.

63. So Polemon in his letter to Julian, Lietzmann, ibid. Frag 176.

64. See the fragment of Julian’s letter to Polemon, ibid Frag 180

65. For instances of Apollinarius’ use of this word, see de Un. 11, Lietzmann, op. cit. p. 190 and 13 (quoted above, p. 52 n. 4 [n. 32]).

66. De Un. 5ibid. p. 187.

67. Cf. in this connection the passages from Apollinarius quoted by Raven op. cit. pp. 208ff., who very rightly draws attention to this aspect of the Laodicene’s teaching, and shows that he should be acquitted of ” the monstrous insinuation of his ancient and modern opponents that he taught the consubstantiality of the flesh and the Godhead” (ibid. p. 210).

68. Lietzmann, op. cit. Frags. 134, 160.

69. Cf. ad Jov. 3, Lietzmann, op. cit. p. 253, Frags. 112, 159, 162, 164ad Dion., Lietzmann, op. cit. p. 259.

70. Cf. his use of Origen’s simile of the iron heated in the fire de Princ. II. vi. 6): ” if the blending of iron with fire, which makes the iron itself appear as fire and brings it about that it performs the works of fire, does not change its nature, so, too, the union of God with the body implies not change of body, although the body extends its divine energy to those who can touch it” (c. Diod., Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 128).

71. So Apollinarius, as quoted by Timothy of Berytus in his letter to Homonius (ibid. p. 278).

72. Cf. the exclamation: ὦ Καινὴ κτίσις καὶ μίξις θεσπεσία· θεὸς καὶ σὰρξ μίαν ἀπετέλεσαν φύσιν (where undoubtedly, φύσις = πρόσωπον, Lietzmann op. cit. Frag. 10, and the statement that “the incarnate Logos is Mediator between God and man, neither wholly man nor wholly God”__i.e. not a man only or the Divine only__“but a mixture of God and man” (Θεοῡ καὶ ἀνθρωπου μίξις), Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 113.

73. Cf. his careful explanation in the fragment from the c. Diod., Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 134.

74. See above, pp. 24f., 40.

75. De Un. 5, Lietzmann, op. cit. p. 187.

76. C, Diod., Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 125

77. Ibid. Frag 130.

78. De Un 10ff., Lietzmann, op. cit. pp. 189ff.

79. De Un. 17ibid. p. 192.

80. See above, pp. 25, 40.

81. It is noteworthy that Apollinarius can say that Christ is ὅλος ἄνθρωπος [i.e. completely human] (de Fid. et Incarn. 3, 6Lietzmann, op. cit. pp. 194, 199): He has indeed a νοῡσ but a heavenly νοῡσ, which is now ἔνσαρκος (cf. Apod., Lietzmann, op. cit.Frags. 69, 72).

82. Anaceph. 4, 16 Lietzmann, pp. 243, 244

83. Lietzmann  op. cit. Frag. 45. According to Rufinus, the Laodicene at first taught that Christ, “assumed only a body and not a soul at all,” and that it was only later that he adopted the trichotomous view. Raven (op. cit. pp. 169ff.) holds that the Laodicene had this view from the start.

84. Apollinarianism, p. 182.

85. De Unit., Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 2 (quoted Raven, op. cit. p. 182).

86. Ad Julian, Lietzmann, op. cit. Frag. 151 (quoted by Raven, op. it. p. 184).

87. Ad Diocaes. 2, Lietzmann, op. cit. p. 256 (quoted by Raven, op. cit. p. 184).

88. Apod.Lietzmann, op. cit. 76.

89. Ibid. Frag. 74.

90. Aneceph.Lietzmann, op. cit. pp. 244f. Cf. Also the passage in c. Apoll. i. 2, which is quoted by Raven (op. cit. p. 244) as “perhaps genuinely Apollinarian.”

91. Pp. 90,.

92. Ibid. pp. 188, 228f.

93. Ibid. p. 202.

94. See Dorner, op. cit. I. ii. pp. 371ff., and, for a criticism of this view, op. cit. pp. 185ff.

95. For a full treatment of this subject__and the complete vindication of Apollinarius as the teacher who, while missing the closeness of the union of the Godhead and manhood in Christ, rejects all ideas of the “confusion” of these elements__see esp. Raven, op. cit. pp. 212-19.

96. Ep. ci

97. Cf. Raven, op. cit. pp. 262ff.

98. Antirrhet. 41 (quote by Raven, op. cit. p. 270).

99. Sp Gregory of Nazianzus, Ep. Ci (ad Cled.). Cyril uses the same phrase; see below, p. 102 n. 3.

100. Cf. the decree of the Roman Synod, held under Damasus in 377 (when Apollinarius and Timothy of Berytus were condemned): Si imperfectus homo susceptus est, imperfectum Dei munus est, imperfecta nostra salus, quia non est totus homo salvatus (Damasus, Ep. ii, Fr, ii; P. L. xiii. 353.)